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REFLECTIONS ON PREPAREDNESS: 
PANDEMIC PLANNING IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 
STEWART SIMONSON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It may seem hard to believe today, but there was a time when pandemic 
influenza was not a subject of much interest anywhere outside of public 
health agencies like the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).  Indeed, the whole history of influenza preparedness 
can be summarized as decades of inactivity followed by months of anxiety 
and years of second-guessing.  If the recent criticism of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) is any indication, H1N1 seems to be following this 
pattern.1  It is almost as if Santayana had influenza in mind when he 
observed that “[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it.”2  And influenza has quite a past.3  The 1918 pandemic was the 
most lethal plague in human history—killing between fifty million and one 
hundred million people worldwide in a matter of months.4  If we are to 
avoid this magnitude of devastation from occurring again, we must learn 
from our experience with influenza.  My analysis of the facts and my 
experience working on pandemic preparedness has taught me the following 
lessons: 
 
* Former Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  Currently, Vice 
President, SRA International, Inc. in Washington, DC.  Special thanks to Greg Folkers, Stuart 
Nightingale, James LeDuc, Ladd Wiley, and Claudia Simonson for their helpful comments. 
 1. See Robert Roos, Who Says H1N1 Pandemic is Over, U. OF MINN. CTR. FOR 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POL’Y, Aug. 10, 2010, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/ 
content/influenza/swineflu/news/aug1010who.html (summarizing WHO’s response to H1N1 
and its defense against critics who have accused the agency of “exaggerating the pandemic 
threat”).  In the case of H1N1, decades of inactivity were punctuated by roughly six years of 
concerted effort (including funding) to prepare for a pandemic. 
 2. GEORGE SANTAYANA, REASON IN COMMON SENSE, 284 (Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 1980). 
 3. See generally David M. Morens et al., Pandemic Influenza’s 500th Anniversary, 51 
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1442 (2010) (summarizing the history of pandemic influenza). 
 4. Jeffery K. Taubenberger & David M. Morens, 1918 Influenza: The Mother of All 
Pandemics, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 15, 15 (2006). 
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 Serious and sustained pandemic preparedness can trace its roots to 
2003/2004 at the earliest—one might argue 1997, since that is 
when H5N1 emerged in Hong Kong,5 but the attention to influenza 
following the first H5N1 outbreak was relatively short-lived. 
 Pandemic preparedness has not been a part of the national dialogue 
long enough to be securely imbedded in the policymaking process—
this means it is highly vulnerable to shrinking budgets and shifting 
priorities.6 
 Global influenza surveillance is at the very heart of our national 
security and must be funded accordingly. If effective countermeasures, 
especially vaccines, are to be developed and distributed in time to 
save lives and prevent the type of chaos that was commonplace 
during the 1918 outbreak, a newly emerging pandemic strain must 
be identified as early as technically possible. 
 Better vaccines, antiviral drugs, and diagnostics need to be 
discovered and licensed.  This means consistently and aggressively 
funding the NIH and CDC influenza programs.7  A 1918-like 
pandemic cannot be contained or even modulated with a campaign 
vaccine8 or the current generation of antiviral drugs and diagnostics.9 
 
 5. Carolyn Buxton Bridges et al., Risk of Influenza A (H5N1) Infection among Health 
Care Workers Exposed to Patients with Influenza A (H5N1), Hong Kong, 181 J. INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 344, 344 (2000). 
 6. See Martin Matishak, Former Senators Criticize Possible Cut to Bioshield Funds, 
GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, July 13, 2010, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100713_6726.php. 
 7. See Flu (Influenza): 2009 H1N1, Seasonal, Avian (Bird), Pandemic, NAT’L INST. OF 
ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/flu/Pages/default.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2010) (The NIH influenza programs include not only scientific research, but 
also public awareness information about understanding the flu.).  Flu (Influenza): NIAID 
Influenza Funding Opportunities, NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/Flu/Research/Pages/fundingOps.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 
2010) (highlighting the funding opportunities available for influenza research); Seasonal 
Influenza (Flu), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/ (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2010) (stressing that not only does the CDC influenza program offer research and 
information, but also provides flu surveillance and tracking). 
 8. By campaign vaccine, I mean a vaccine produced once per year (or season) 
according to specifications set for that year (or season).  Each year (or season) requires a new 
vaccine with different specifications.  In the case of influenza, the trivalent vaccine contains 
antigens effective against three influenza viruses that are judged by public health experts to be 
the viruses that will predominate that season.  Influenza viruses rapidly mutate, so a vaccine 
effective one season must be modified to be effective the following season.  The Influenza 
vaccine production process takes at least six months.  There are two main types of influenza:  
influenza A and influenza B.  Influenza A viruses are divided into subtypes identified by two 
surface proteins: hemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N).  There are sixteen hemagglutinin 
subtypes and nine neuraminidase subtypes.  Influenza B viruses are not divided into subtypes.  
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 As an expression of self-interest, the U.S. and other developed 
countries need to provide substantial pandemic preparedness funding 
and technical expertise to the developing world, including assistance 
building disease surveillance systems, laboratory capacity, and 
vaccine production infrastructure. 
 If we declare victory and move on after H1N1, we will be laying the 
foundation for a 1918-like catastrophe.  H1N1 was not the event 
about which scientists and public health leaders have been warning— 
it was, at most, a dress rehearsal. 
In the next few pages, I will outline a brief history of pandemic 
preparedness between 2001 and 2009.  This period covers the 
development of today’s pandemic preparedness and response plan in the 
United States, including building vaccine infrastructure, funding research 
and development, stockpiling vaccine and antiviral drugs, mobilizing 
international support, and establishing other elements of preparedness.  
While 1957, 1968, 1976/1977, and 1997 were all years of substantial 
influenza activity or anxiety,10 the flu has never had much luck capturing the 
attention of policymakers for any length of time and little from those years 
was integrated into a national pandemic preparedness plan.  Indeed, it is 
probably not too much of an exaggeration to say that for most of the last 
fifty years or more, the flu has ranked just ahead of the common cold in 
terms of the perception of threat by policymakers.  In 2001, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) pandemic preparedness 
 
For the 2010/2011 season, the vaccine protects against H1N1 (Pandemic), H3N2, and 
influenza B.  See Catherine Gerdil, The Annual Production Cycle for Influenza Vaccine, 21 
VACCINE 1776, 1776-79 (2003); Types of Influenza Viruses, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/viruses/types.htm (last updated Sept. 17, 2010); 
Selecting the Viruses in the Seasonal Influenza (Flu) Vaccine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/vaccination/virusqa.htm (last updated Oct. 
6, 2010). 
 9. Michael T. Osterholm, Preparing for the Next Pandemic, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED., 
1839, 1840 (2005).  See Gardiner Harris, After Delay, U.S. Faces Line for Flu Drug, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/07/politics/07flu.html (The Bush 
Administration strengthened both international and domestic disease surveillance programs.  
These programs included buying drugs like Tamiflu and investing in research to develop 
alternative methods of making flu vaccines.). 
 10. See Joel C. Gaydos et al., Swine Influenza A Outbreak, Fort Dix, New Jersey, 1976, 
12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 23, 23 (2006) (detailing the swine flu outbreak in 1976-
77); Lone Simonsen et al., The Impact of Influenza Epidemics on Mortality: Introducing a 
Severity Index, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1944, 1949 (1997); René Snacken et al., The Next 
Influenza Pandemic: Lessons from Hong Kong, 1997, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 195, 
195-97 (1999) (highlighting the emergence of avian flu and looking at the historical trends of 
new strains of influenza). 
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plan was still a draft—albeit a working one—and remained so until 2005.11  
Accordingly, this article will not focus on events and milestones that 
occurred prior to 2001. 
II.  MY BACKGROUND 
From 1995 to 1999, I was counsel to Tommy G. Thompson, then-
Governor of Wisconsin.12  In addition to the usual duties of an in-house 
lawyer, I was responsible for emergency preparedness policy and planning 
in the Office of the Governor.  As a consequence, I had been involved on 
the periphery in public health preparedness for the state, including 
biodefense—to the extent we were doing work in this area.13 
In late 1997, I read an article in The New Yorker by Malcolm Gladwell 
about the 1918 influenza pandemic and an effort then underway to obtain 
DNA from the bodies of miners who died during the pandemic and were 
buried in the permafrost in Norway.14  Prior to reading the article, I really 
had little appreciation for the enormity of the 1918 outbreak and its impact 
on every corner of the globe.  I had heard stories about one of my great 
aunts dying from the Spanish Flu,15 but beyond that I knew nothing.  So, the 
 
 11. HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).  The work to finalize the 
HHS pandemic plan was ably led by Dr. Bruce Gellin, HHS Deputy Assistant Secretary and 
Director, National Vaccine Program Office.  His contributions to pandemic preparedness are 
too numerous to list and his positive influence on U.S. vaccine policy extends well beyond 
influenza.  It was a privilege collaborating with Dr. Gellin on pandemic preparedness. 
 12. WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, THE WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 301-53 (2009), available 
at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/bb/97bb/ch6a.pdf.  See also Tommy Thompson: Secretary of 
Health & Human Services (2001 – 2005), WHITE HOUSE, http://georgewbush-whitehouse. 
archives.gov/government/thompson-bio.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Tommy 
Thompson]. 
 13. This included a state effort to obtain funding from the CDC to build public health 
preparedness capacity in Wisconsin.  In February 1999, CDC launched the Public Health 
Preparedness and Response to Bioterrorism Cooperative Agreement Program, which made 
approximately $41 million available to states to build a public health preparedness 
infrastructure.  See Statement on Bioterrorism Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and 
Gov’t Info., Subcomm. on Youth Violence, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. passim 
(1999) (statement of Dr. James M. Hughes, Director, National Center for Infectious Diseases, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t990 
420a.html.  I worked closely on this initiative with Dr. Jeffrey Davis of the Wisconsin Division 
of Public Health and Dr. Ronald Laessig of the Wisconsin State Laboratory of Hygiene.  Dr. 
Davis and Dr. Laessig were the thought leaders for our proposal to the CDC and both taught 
me much about public health preparedness. 
 14. Malcolm Gladwell, The Dead Zone, NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 1997, at 52, 52-54. 
 15. See ALFRED W. CROSBY, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC: THE INFLUENZA OF 1918 
passim (Cambridge University Press 1989) (describing the historical context of the 1918 
pandemic, also known as the Spanish Flu).  See also Taubenberger & Morens, supra note 4 
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Gladwell piece really captured my interest.  In the article, he noted that 
public health authorities in the U.S. were always concerned about a 1918-
like virus emerging.16  A few weeks later, I mentioned the Gladwell article to 
Governor Thompson and asked him what he knew about the 1918 
pandemic.  The Governor knew more about it than I had prior to reading 
the Gladwell piece, but, like me, he was interested in learning more— 
specifically, how well prepared we were for something like it today.  The 
Governor suggested I do a little research on pandemic preparedness and 
give him a briefing on my findings.17  I have to admit this was more of an 
academic interest than anything else.  We had so many other policy issues 
to work through (everything from Private School Choice in Milwaukee to 
Indian gaming to Truth-in-Sentencing) that I really did not think of pandemic 
preparedness as a pressing concern for the State of Wisconsin (or, for that 
matter, any state). 
It was, however, interesting and so over the next few months I did some 
research at the University of Wisconsin Medical School library.  Among the 
literature I read was Alfred Crosby’s account of the 1918 outbreak in 
America’s Forgotten Pandemic, which Gladwell had referenced in his New 
Yorker article.18  I learned a great deal about the flu and did, in fact, give 
the Governor an extensive briefing on the 1918 pandemic—probably much 
more than he wanted.  While this project of mine had absolutely no impact 
on pandemic preparedness in Wisconsin in the late ‘90s, it did typecast me 
as the public health preparedness point-man when Governor Thompson 
was nominated to be President Bush’s first Secretary of Health and Human 
Services.  When it came time to brief the Governor for his confirmation 
hearings, I was the person responsible for preparing him for whatever 
influenza or biodefense questions he might get during the confirmation 
process.  And I have to say that no one—including me—expected that he 
would get such questions.  But I found this assignment interesting and the 
Governor—to his credit—was eager to learn all that he could about public 
health preparedness. 
 
passim.  There is no evidence that the 1918 pandemic emerged in Spain.  But Spain was 
neutral during World War I and, unlike the combatant countries, did not censor the press.  
The 1918 disease became known as the Spanish Flu “very likely because newspapers were 
publishing accounts of the spread of the disease that were picked up in other countries . . .  
Spanish papers were filled with reports of the disease especially when King Alphonse XIII fell 
seriously ill.”  JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPIC STORY OF THE DEADLIEST PLAGUE 
IN HISTORY 171 (2004). 
 16. Gladwell, supra note 14, at 61-64. 
 17. Such assignments were a regular occurrence in Governor Thompson’s office.  During 
the more than twenty years that I have known him, he has always had an acute sense of 
intellectual curiosity.  This was one reason I mentioned the Gladwell article to the Governor. 
 18. CROSBY, supra note 15. 
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A. Pre-9/11 
Governor Thompson was sworn in as HHS Secretary on February 2, 
2001.19  I had decided not to leave Amtrak, where I had been serving as 
Corporate Secretary and Counsel since 1999.20  I agreed, however, to 
become a Special Government Employee (SGE) to work—without pay—on 
preparedness issues during Secretary Thompson’s transition.  After the 
transition, I joined HHS full-time as Deputy General Counsel, then became 
Special Counsel for Preparedness, and later was appointed Assistant 
Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness.21 
During the first seven months of the Bush administration, few in the 
political ranks of the department, other than Secretary Thompson and 
several senior aides, were particularly interested in public health 
preparedness.22  There were a number of U.S. Public Health Service 
(USPHS) officers and other career officials who were enormously dedicated 
to preparedness, but, with a few exceptions, it was not a priority for political 
appointees at HHS.23  In fairness, it was the beginning of the Administration 
and so much was in play.  At the time, the Bush stem cell policy was 
 
 19. Tommy Thompson, supra note 12. 
 20. OFFICE OF FED. REG., NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT MANUAL 476 (2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/get 
doc.cgi?dbname=2001_government_manual&docid=188578tx_xxx-81.pdf. 
 21. GEORGE W. BUSH, 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1172 app. 
A (2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2004_ 
public_papers_vol1_misc&page=1172&position=all. Following the events of September 
2001, Secretary Thompson administratively established the Office of Public Health 
Preparedness (OPHP) within the Office of the Secretary, HHS.  This office was led by a 
Director appointed by the Secretary.  Dr. D.A. Henderson was appointed by Secretary 
Thompson to be the first Director of OPHP.  See D.A. Henderson to Direct New Office of 
Public Health Preparedness, CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL’Y, Nov. 6, 2001, 
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/110601henderson.html.  In 
2002, Congress created the position of Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness, a presidential appointment.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-10 (2006).  OPHP was 
merged into the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness.  
Several Acting Assistant Secretaries led the office (including Dr. William Raub) until 2004 
when President Bush appointed me to be the first Assistant Secretary for Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness. 
 22. Ladd Wiley, HHS Deputy General Counsel and a former colleague of mine in the 
Governor’s Office, and Sally Canfield, Counselor to the Secretary and a Thompson transition 
staffer, worked closely with me on preparedness policy development.  In addition, Robert 
Wood, Thompson’s Chief of Staff, assigned the department’s White House Fellow, Lt. Cdr. 
Kathryn Allen, USN, to work on biodefense-related projects.  See Kathryn Allen, Experiencing 
the Transition, 26 WHITE HOUSE FELLOWS, no. 2, 2001 at 1, 3. 
 23. See generally Marilyn Werber Serafini & Gia Fenoglio, Health and Human Services 
Department Profiles, 33 NAT’L J. 1948-52 (2001) (the lack of demonstrated interest by the 
HHS heads illustrates that influenza was not their priority). 
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emerging and there were a number of other highly charged issues on the 
department’s agenda.  Nevertheless, several times a week, I would leave 
Union Station and travel across the Mall to the Hubert H. Humphrey 
Building, HHS Headquarters, to spend a few hours on preparedness issues, 
including pandemic preparedness.  Secretary Thompson had directed CDC 
to detail a senior physician to the Immediate Office of the Secretary to focus 
on public health preparedness full-time24 and there were several career 
officials in the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation working on preparedness.  The Clinton Administration’s Assistant 
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Dr. Margaret A. Hamburg, had done 
excellent work in developing preparedness plans and directing preparedness 
investments.25  I sought to pick-up where Dr. Hamburg had left off, and 
Secretary Thompson was eager for me to do this.  Indeed, he used to call 
me in for briefings on a fairly regular basis.  While most political appointees 
in the department paid little or no attention to public health preparedness, 
Secretary Thompson was committed to it from the outset.  From tornadoes 
to floods to forest fires, emergency preparedness and response is an 
everyday fact of life for a governor.  Whether a governor’s tenure is a 
success or a failure can turn on how an emergency operation is managed.  
Secretary Thompson saw public health preparedness in this context and the 
same can be said for his successor at HHS, Governor Michael O. Leavitt.26 
B. 9/11 
As I indicated, Dr. Hamburg had been very effective in the Clinton 
Administration in making public health preparedness a priority.  She and her 
staff made important, enduring contributions to pandemic planning and the 
product of this effort became the foundation for our work.  Indeed, on the 
morning of September 11, 2001, a pandemic preparedness briefing was on 
Secretary Thompson’s calendar.27  Once the second plane hit the World 
 
 24. Dr. Scott Lillibridge was formally named Special Assistant to the Secretary with 
responsibility for bioterrorism preparedness on July 10, 2001.  HHS Names Physician to 
Coordinate Anti-Bioterrorism Initiatives, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (July 10, 2001), 
http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20010710a.html. 
 25. Prior to her appointment as HHS Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Dr. 
Hamburg was Commissioner of Health and Mental Hygiene for the City of New York.  She 
was one of the pioneers in biodefense and public health preparedness.  In 2009, President 
Obama appointed Dr. Hamburg to be Commissioner of Food and Drugs.  Gardiner Harris, 
Former New York Official Is Called Choice for F.D.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at A20. 
 26. Gardiner Harris, Fear of Flu Outbreak Rattles Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, 
at A23. 
 27. This briefing was to be led by Dr. William Raub, then-Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation.  Dr. Raub had been Dr. Hamburg’s principal deputy 
and he played an important role in providing continuity on public health preparedness matters 
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Trade Center, the schedule was cleared and the pandemic preparedness 
briefing was put on hold until later in 2001 or the beginning of 2002. 
C. Post-9/11 
Following the events of 9/11 and the anthrax letters later that month,28 
Congress focused on improving public health preparedness in the United 
States.  Billions were sent to the states, through CDC and the Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), to build public health 
infrastructure and substantial funds were appropriated to NIH to catapult 
biodefense basic research forward—and this included work on influenza.29  
But in 2001—another virus was in the headlines: smallpox.30  At the time, I 
was focused almost exclusively on leading the contracting effort to 
accelerate development of the second-generation smallpox vaccine.31  This 
 
between administrations.  He later served as Dr. Henderson’s deputy in the newly created 
Office of Public Health Preparedness and later Acting Assistant Secretary for Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness.  Earlier in his career, Dr. Raub had been a Deputy Director of NIH.  
See The NIH Almanac – Historical Data, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/historical/deputy_directors.htm (last 
updated Nov. 9, 2010).  He was a respected adviser to both Secretary Thompson and 
Secretary Leavitt. 
 28. The Anthrax Letters, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/publication/ 
9555/anthrax_letters.html (last updated Jan. 2006).  See also Sheryl Gay Solberg & Alison 
Mitchell, A Nation Challenged:  The Overview; Letter Containing Anthrax Sent to U.S. Senate 
Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C05EF 
D81F3FF935A25753C1A9679C8B63&scp=2&sq=anthrax%20letters%20a%20nation%20c
hallenged%20overview&st=cse. 
 29. See HHS Provides $1.4 Billion More to States and Hospitals for Terrorism 
Preparedness, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Sept. 2, 2003), http://archive.hhs.gov/ 
news/press/2003pres/20030902.html. 
 30. See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, Countering the Small Pox Threat, 288 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 
50, 50-51 (2001). 
 31. The contract to accelerate development of the second-generation smallpox vaccine 
was awarded on November 28, 2001, to Acambis of Cambridge, Massachusetts.  ACAMBIS, 
INC., ACAM2000: SMALLPOX VACCINE: VACCINES AND RELATED BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE (VRBPAC) BRIEFING DOCUMENT 7 (Apr. 18, 2007), available at http://www.fda. 
gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4292B2-02.pdf.  This contract was essentially the 
continuation of the smallpox vaccine research and development project that Dr. Hamburg 
launched in 1999.  See Statement on Bioterrorism Before the S. Appropriations Subcomm. 
Comm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ., & Related Agencies, 106th Cong. passim 
(1999) (statement of Dr. Margaret A. Hamburg, Assistant Sec’y for Planning & Evaluation, 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/ 
t990316a.html; Donald A. Henderson et al., Smallpox as a Biological Weapon: Medical and 
Public Health Management, 281 JAMA 2127, 2136 (1999); James W. LeDuc & Peter B. 
Jahrling, Strengthening National Preparedness for Smallpox: An Update, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (last updated Mar. 5, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7 
no1/leduc.htm. 
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project was guided by a core group of scientists, including Dr. D.A. 
Henderson,32 Dr. Anthony S. Fauci,33 Dr. John LaMontagne,34 Dr. Philip K. 
Russell,35 Dr. James LeDuc,36 Dr. William Raub,37 and Dr. Scott Lillibridge.38 
During one of the early meetings of this group, I recall a side discussion 
with Dr. Fauci and Dr. LaMontagne about influenza.  Dr. LaMontagne told 
me that if anything would get us, it would not be smallpox, but the flu.39  
 
 32. Following the events of 9/11, Secretary Thompson personally recruited Dr. 
Henderson to lead the newly created Office of Public Health Preparedness.  He became the 
architect of the post-9/11 HHS public health preparedness program and a mentor to many in 
the department, including me.  Dr. Henderson was precisely the type of leader this new office 
needed in the dark days following 9/11.  Earlier in his career, Dr. Henderson directed the 
successful WHO-led effort to eradicate smallpox, one of mankind’s greatest achievements.  
Following this, he was appointed Dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health.  D.A. 
Henderson: Professional Profile, U. OF PITTSBURGH MED. CTR., http://www.upmc-
biosecurity.org/website/center/staff/henderson.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).  See also 
D.A. HENDERSON, SMALLPOX:  THE DEATH OF A DISEASE 290-92 (2009). 
 33. Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of 
Health. 
 34. Late Deputy Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National 
Institutes of Health. 
 35. Secretary Thompson, Dr. Henderson, and I recruited Dr. Russell to lead the 
countermeasure Research and Development (R&D) program, within the Office of Public Health 
Preparedness.  Earlier in his career, Dr. Russell served as the Commanding Officer, U.S. 
Army’s Medical Research and Materiel Command.  By the Fall of 2001, Dr. Russell had long 
since retired from the Army and was serving on the faculty of the Johns Hopkins School of 
Public Health and the board of the Sabin Vaccine Institute.  When it became clear how much 
HHS needed him, Dr. Russell put aside his personal wishes and returned to government 
service.  His contributions to public health and biodefense are too numerous to list.  See Philip 
K. Russell, MD, SABIN VACCINE INST., http://www.sabin.org/about-us/executive/philip-k-russell-
md (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).  See also HENDERSON supra note 32, at 289-90. 
 36. Dr. James LeDuc, then-Director, CDC Division of Viral and Ricketsial Diseases, led 
the CDC project team responsible for developing the second-generation smallpox vaccine.  
He later served as the CDC influenza coordinator.  See Influenza Coordination Unit Organizes 
to Meet Pan Flu Threat, CCID SPECTRUM, Sept. 2006, http://www2.cdc.gov/spectrum/vol1no 
4/CCID_influenza_coordination_unit.html.  Today, he is Director of the Galveston National 
Laboratory, University of Texas Medical Branch.  See Garland D. Anderson, Message from the 
Provost, available at http://www.som.utmb.edu/news/031510_GNL_IHII_Leadership.pdf.  He 
is one of the finest public servants with whom I have had the privilege to serve. 
 37. Then-Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 
 38. Special Assistant to the Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. In 
addition to these individuals, the successful effort to accelerate the development of the 
second-generation smallpox vaccine benefited substantially from the expertise of the late 
Joseph Gilchrist, Lorenzo Falgiano, Charlotte Flitcraft, Debra Yeskey, John Beecher, and 
George French all of the CDC, and Katherine Drews and Jonathan Baker of the HHS Office 
of General Counsel. 
 39. Dr. LaMontagne died in November 2004.  Joe Holley, NIH Administrator John La 
Montagne Dies, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2004, at B6.  To honor Dr. LaMontagne and recognize 
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And what I subsequently learned about the history and properties of the 
influenza virus corroborated Dr. LaMontagne’s statement.  It should be 
noted that both Dr. Fauci and Dr. LaMontagne were integral to our work to 
accelerate development of the second-generation smallpox vaccine and 
their positive influence can be seen in everything we accomplished in 
building a biodefense research and development program at HHS.40 
But even with such staunch advocates, only modest progress had 
occurred over the years in improving the U.S. licensed inactivated flu 
vaccine.  Today’s licensed influenza vaccine is made using 1950s 
technology.41  Essentially, embryonated chicken eggs serve as little bio-
reactors.42  Hundreds of thousands of chickens producing millions of eggs 
are needed every year.43  Depending on how well the strains selected for 
that year grow, vaccine production can take between six and nine months.44  
And the process is vulnerable to any number of perils—including influenza 
itself, which can kill the chickens producing the eggs needed to make the 
vaccine.45 
The events of September 2001 made bioterrorism our principal focus 
and not influenza.  And no one—then or now—thinks influenza is a serious 
bioterror threat.  Smallpox, anthrax, and other bioterrorism agents were our 
top priority.  But, pandemic influenza preparedness benefited in at least two 
important ways from the heightened attention directed at bioterrorism.  First 
and foremost, NIH received a substantial increase in funding for 
bioterrorism-related basic research and influenza research was included in 
 
his lifelong commitment to influenza research and pandemic preparedness, HHS sponsored, 
in 2005, the John R. LaMontagne Symposium on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness.  The 
LaMontagne Symposium was convened by the Institute of Medicine for the purpose of 
identifying gaps in influenza research.  See John R. LaMontagne Symposium on Pandemic 
Influenza Preparedness, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., http://www.iom.edu/Activities/ 
Disease/LaMontaigneFluSymp.aspx (last updated Oct. 11, 2009). 
 40. Dr. Fauci’s influence reached far beyond biodefense research and development.  
During my five years at HHS, I consulted with Dr. Fauci on all manner of issues.  Secretary 
Thompson and Secretary Leavitt similarly relied on Dr. Fauci’s excellent judgment.  He spent a 
great deal of time teaching me--and other appointees--about emerging and reemerging 
infectious diseases as well as about science policy and interagency diplomacy.  But most 
importantly, Dr. Fauci taught me an enormous amount about how to be a good public 
servant.  It was an honor to work with him. 
 41. Osterholm, supra note 9, at 1839. 
 42. Nell Greenfieldboyce, New and Old Ways to Make Flu Vaccines, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, 
Nov. 8, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16105360.  See 
Osterholm, supra note 9, at 1839-40. 
 43. Osterholm, supra note 9. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Greenfieldboyce, supra note 42. 
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this portfolio.46  No amount of planning for a biological event like an 
anthrax release or an influenza pandemic can overcome the absence of 
effective medical countermeasures.  The investment in biodefense basic 
research that occurred after the events of September 2001 has contributed 
to science’s understanding of the influenza virus and funded work, which will 
surely lead to additions to the influenza armamentarium.47 
Second, Secretary Thompson increased international engagement 
related to public health preparedness by proposing that a group of health 
ministers meet periodically to coordinate efforts to prepare for bioterror 
events.  In November 2001, health ministers from Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
joined representatives from WHO and the European Commission in Ottawa 
to establish the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI).48  The ministers 
pledged to strengthen public health preparedness and response planning for 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear emergencies.49  At the 
December 2002 GHSI ministerial meeting in Mexico City, Secretary 
Thompson argued successfully to broaden GHSI’s mandate to include 
 
 46. See NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., FY 2010 BUDGET 7 (2010), available at http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/appro 
priations/index.htm (2010) (In FY2002, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases (NIAID) received over $2.3 billion in funding, $187 million of which was directed at 
biodefense.  Today, NIAID receives more than $4.7 billion in funding, $1.6 billion of which is 
directed at biodefense.  See id. at 19.).  NIAID is the NIH institute responsible for research to 
“better understand, treat, and ultimately prevent infectious, immunologic, and allergic 
diseases.”  Who We Are and What We Do, NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.niaid.nih.gov/about/Pages/default.aspx (last 
updated Apr. 12, 2010).  See also NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OPEN LETTER IN SCIENCE REGARDING NIH BIODEFENSE FUNDING 3 
(2005), available at http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:ZMUNHfPzDu 
sJ:www.niaid.nih.gov/news/newsreleases/2005/pages/scienceletter.aspx+biodefense+budge
t+NIAID&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.google.com (showing that remarkable 
increase in biodefense spending from $42 million in FY2001 to $187 million in FY2002 to 
nearly $1.2 billion in FY2003); NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2009 FACT BOOK:  A YEAR IN REVIEW passim (2010), 
available at http://www.niaid.nih.gov/about/whoWeAre/Documents/fy09FactBook.pdf. 
 47. See The Role of NIH-Supported Research in the Response to 2009 H1N1 Influenza, 
Statement Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ. & Related Agencies, 
H. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. passim (2009) (statement of Anthony S. Fauci, 
MD, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of 
Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), available at http://www.niaid.nih. 
gov/about/directors/Documents/110409niaidstatementlhhsh1n1.pdf. 
 48. Overview: Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI), GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY INITIATIVE, 
http://www.ghsi.ca/english/background.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
 49. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
16 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 4:5 
pandemic influenza preparedness.50  Since then, GHSI has included a 
pandemic influenza working group.  Adding influenza preparedness to 
GHSI’s mandate created a framework for close coordination in the nascent 
work of preparing for a pandemic.51 
III.  WHO INFLUENZA SURVEILLANCE 
Each May, the principal governing body of the World Health 
Organization—the World Health Assembly—meets at the U.N. complex in 
Geneva, Switzerland, where delegations from 193 Member States listen 
more or less politely to a series of predictable speeches.52  In 2002 and 
subsequently, I served on the U.S. delegation to the World Health Assembly.  
In addition to the formal agenda for the Assembly, a number of side-
meetings, informal conferences and bilateral discussions occur.53  One such 
meeting was an influenza surveillance briefing by WHO staff for the then-
HHS Assistant Secretary for Health and me.54  We spent several hours 
discussing the global influenza surveillance network and its gaps.  We also 
talked about readiness: how well prepared were Member States and what 
could be done to improve it.  When I returned to Washington, I briefed 
Secretary Thompson on our pandemic discussions at WHO and he asked 
that I develop a plan to improve our pandemic preparedness posture. 
IV.  ALFRED CROSBY—AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC 
The first order of business in moving our pandemic preparedness effort 
forward was to put the threat in context—in other words, to understand the 
impact of the 1918 virus.  As I noted, Professor Alfred Crosby’s book, 
America’s Forgotten Pandemic, was cited in Malcolm Gladwell’s article.  
Since Crosby’s book had made such an impact on me, I wanted to begin 
our pandemic preparedness effort with a talk by him.  I contacted Professor 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. World Health Assembly Opens, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 19, 2008), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2008/wha01/en/index.html. 
 53. In May 2004, for example, Secretary Thompson convened a pandemic preparedness 
meeting with health ministers from Asia during the 57th World Health Assembly.  This meeting 
included ministers from countries then most at risk from H5N1.  In addition to Secretary 
Thompson and myself, U.S. participants included the following HHS officials: Dr. Bruce Gellin, 
Dr. Nancy Cox, Dr. William Steiger, Mary Lou Valdez, and David Hohman; and Dr. Robert 
Webster of the St. Jude’s Children’s Research Hospital, a world renowned influenza expert.  
See Meeting minutes from the National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC) (June 1-2, 
2004) (on file with author). 
 54. In May 2002, Dr. Eve Slater, then-HHS Assistant Secretary for Health, and I met with 
several WHO officials about global influenza surveillance: Dr. David Heyman, Dr. Klaus 
Stohr, Dr. Mike Ryan, and Dr. Ray Arthur (a CDC assignee to WHO). 
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Crosby at his home in New England and he agreed to come to Washington 
to spend a few hours with most of the senior HHS officials—both political 
and career—involved in influenza policymaking.55  Everyone in the room 
knew about the 1918 pandemic and what—in general—it had done to the 
country (and the world).  But the magnitude of the disruption shocked me 
(and others) then—as it still does today.  What became clear to everyone 
present was that we were not ready for a 1918-like event, not even close.  
My colleagues and I left the Crosby talk with two priorities: (1) close gaps in 
global influenza surveillance and (2) dramatically improve our capacity to 
make influenza vaccine (both egg-based vaccine and, eventually, cell-
culture vaccine). 
V.  THE INFLUENZA INITIATIVE—$250 MILLION 
Following a number of meetings and budget discussions, several HHS 
thought leaders56 crafted a $250 million proposal to begin work on creating 
a cell-culture influenza vaccine for the U.S. and to secure the egg supply for 
the licensed vaccine.57  The idea was to launch a Research and 
Development (R&D) initiative with one of the vaccine makers to produce a 
cell-culture vaccine.  At the time, there was no U.S. work of any significance 
going on in this area.  There was at least one cell-culture influenza vaccine 
in pilot production in Europe,58 but no pharmaceutical firms at the time were 
doing any influenza cell-culture work in the U.S. or for the U.S. market.  So 
we thought we could enter into a contract with Sanofi Pasteur or Chiron 
(then the only makers of licensed inactivated flu vaccine for the U.S.) to 
begin an R&D effort for cell-culture influenza vaccine and build new 
capacity for cell-culture production.  It is important to understand that there 
is nothing revolutionary about cell-culture vaccine.  There are a number of 
 
 55. Dr. D.A. Henderson introduced Professor Crosby and moderated the discussion.  Dr. 
Henderson was—and remains—a strong proponent for pandemic influenza preparedness. 
 56. This group included Lester Cash, William Beldon, and Kerry Weems of the HHS 
budget office, and Dr. William Raub, then of the Office of Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness. 
 57. The $250 million influenza vaccine initiative was part of a larger proposal to improve 
the Nation’s domestic vaccine production capacity.  The proposal was developed at the 
request of Secretary Thompson and included what later became Project BioShield.  See Ted 
Agres, Bioshield Moving Forward: Unlimited Spending Authority and Industry Liability Remain 
Key Stumbling Blocks, SCIENTIST, May 16, 2003, http://cmbi.bjmu.edu.cn/news/0305/ 
153.htm. 
 58. Baxter Receives European Commission Approval for CELVAPAN H1N1 Pandemic 
Influenza Vaccine, BAXTER (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.baxter.com/press_room/press_releases/ 
2009/10_07_09-celvapan.html. 
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licensed vaccines in the U.S. made with cell culture technology.59  But the 
consensus among vaccine experts at HHS was that a cell culture influenza 
vaccine would be more reliable than the currently licensed vaccine and it 
would be readily scalable because cell culture vaccine production does not 
require eggs.  Instead, human cells or some other cell line are used in 
bioreactors to make the vaccine.60  Cell-culture influenza vaccine would not 
solve our pandemic preparedness problems, but it would be faster—by a 
few months—and more secure. 
In addition to developing a cell-culture vaccine for the U.S., we needed 
to secure the egg supply for the licensed vaccine.  As I mentioned, there are 
hundreds of thousands of chickens producing millions of eggs each year for 
the U.S. licensed influenza vaccine, but these chickens are vulnerable to 
avian diseases, including influenza itself.  If such a disease were to wipe out 
the egg supply for the vaccine makers, the vaccine manufacturing process 
would be set back a number of months, until the flock could be 
reconstituted.  The chickens that produce the eggs for vaccine production 
are specialized—indeed, they have been bred for this work.  So we needed 
a contingency or standby flock—ready to step in if something should 
happen to the primary flock. 
The $250 million vaccine proposal funded both of these projects.  Since 
it was a relatively modest amount of money, we thought we stood a good 
chance of getting it funded in the President’s 2004 budget request.  But we 
also understood that it often takes a few years to get a new initiative 
approved and resourced.  Each year, competing priorities run the budget 
gauntlet where some do better than others.  In the Fall of 2003, we learned 
that the HHS influenza initiative fell into the latter category—it was not going 
to be funded in the President’s 2004 budget.  Initially we thought we would 
need to wait for the 2005 request, but then an alternate strategy emerged. 
As is well known, Vice President Cheney was an effective advocate for 
biodefense and public health preparedness.  During my five years at HHS, I 
cannot recall a single week that I—and many others at HHS—did not have 
contact with the Office of the Vice President.61  When we saw that the HHS 
influenza initiative was not going to be funded in the President’s 2004 
 
 59. See generally STANLEY A. PLOTKIN, WALTER A. ORENSTEIN & PAUL A. OFFIT, VACCINES 5, 
7 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that the “golden age of vaccine development” occurred in 1949, 
using cell culture). 
 60. Greenfieldboyce, supra note 42. 
 61. Our principal interlocutor in the Office of the Vice President was Carol Kuntz, Ph.D., 
a Department of Defense career official who served as the Assistant to the Vice President for 
Homeland Security.  See OFFICE OF FED. REG., NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECS. ADMIN.,THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 2004/2005 90 (2004), available at http://frwebgate.access. 
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2004_government_manual&docid=198805tx_xxx-
19.pdf. 
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budget, Secretary Thompson gave me permission to approach the Office of 
the Vice President and seek their assistance in obtaining funding in the 2004 
budget.  I have a very specific recollection of a telephone conversation 
between Secretary Thompson and an official at the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) about the pandemic vaccine initiative which concluded 
with the Secretary saying: “I’ll have to go to the Veep on this.”  Following 
that conversation, I went to the White House and briefed Vice President 
Cheney’s staff on the HHS influenza initiative.62  Vice President Cheney had 
been President Ford’s Chief of Staff during the 1976 swine flu scare63 so he 
already knew about the influenza threat in some detail.  When he was 
briefed on the HHS initiative, he signed on right away.  Shortly thereafter, 
Vice President Cheney and Secretary Thompson met with President Bush in 
the Oval Office where they obtained the President’s approval for putting 
$100 million into the President’s 2004 budget request.64  It was not what we 
had requested, but it was a very good start.  Unfortunately, as often 
happens with new programs, Congress only partially funded the President’s 
request and the result was a $50 million initiative—not enough to do 
anything meaningful with cell-culture vaccine, but more than sufficient to 
secure the egg supply for the licensed vaccine.65 
The year 2004 turned out to be an inflection point for influenza 
preparedness in the United States.  In addition to the HHS vaccine being 
launched, two events outside the U.S. persuaded policymakers to address 
pandemic preparedness in earnest: following several years of apparent 
 
 62. This briefing included I. Lewis (Scooter) Libby, Chief of Staff to the Vice President; Dr. 
Carol Kuntz, Assistant to the Vice President for Homeland Security; Capt. Bruce Miller, USN, 
Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for Homeland Security; Dr. Noreen Hynes, USPHS, an 
HHS assignee in the Office of the Vice President. 
 63. STEPHEN F. HAYES, CHENEY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL AND 
CONTROVERSIAL VICE PRESIDENT 78 (2007).  See David J. Sencer & J. Donald Millar, Reflections 
on the 1976 Swine Flu Vaccination Program, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 29, 29 
(2006). 
 64. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FY 2004 BUDGET IN BRIEF 91 (2004).  Secretary 
Thompson invested substantial amounts of political capital in pandemic preparedness well 
before influenza was recognized outside of the public health community as much of a threat.  
During his tenure at HHS, he consistently advocated for more resources to be invested in 
pandemic preparedness.  In his farewell press conference, Secretary Thompson identified 
pandemic influenza as one of the greatest public health challenges facing the U.S.  See 
William Branigin, Mike Allen & John Mintz, Tommy Thompson Resigns from HHS, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 3, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A31377-2004Dec3.html. 
 65. Secretary Thompson Announces Contract to Secure Future Egg Supply for Flu 
Vaccines, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Nov. 9, 2004, http://archive.hhs.gov/news/ 
press/2004pres/20041109a.html. 
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dormancy, H5N1 reemerged in Hong Kong66 and in the very midst of the 
2004 election, the Chiron seasonal influenza vaccine failed—resulting in a 
loss of approximately half of the licensed U.S. influenza vaccine supply.67 
VI.  H5N1 REEMERGES (2003/2004) 
Following the Hong Kong control effort in 1997, H5N1 did not show 
itself again until the end of 2003—beginning of 2004: first in Hong Kong 
and then Vietnam.68  This created sufficient anxiety within HHS and 
elsewhere in the federal government to enable HHS to take two important 
steps toward preparing for a pandemic.  First, work began to develop a 
vaccine against H5N1.  And second, HHS purchased an initial quantity of 
 
 66. J.S.M. Peiris et al., Re-emergence of Fatal Human Influenza A Subtype H5N1 Disease, 
363 LANCET 617, 617-19 (2004). 
 67. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RES., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BIORESEARCH 
MONITORING: WARNING LETTERS ISSUED TO EIGHT CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS CONDUCTING STUDIES 
WITH INVESTIGATIONAL PRODUCTS 8 (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ 
EnforcementActions/EnforcementStory/EnforcementStoryArchive/UCM091058.pdf; Andrew 
Pollack, U.S. Will Miss Half Its Supply of Flu Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, October 6, 2004, at A20.  
See also Flu Shot Shortage Looms, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 6, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/ 
2004/10/05/news/midcaps/chiron.  The emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) in March of 2003 also played a role in focusing policymakers on pandemic influenza 
preparedness.  Initial reporting about SARS even referred to the virus as a “killer flu.”  See 
Thomas Crampton, Killer Flu Is Traced to a Hotel in Hong Kong, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 
20, 2003, at 9. Concern about the spread of SARS also led President Bush in April 2003 to 
amend the list of quarantinable diseases to include SARS.  The last time a disease was added 
to the list had been in 1983 when President Reagan amended the list to include Ebola and 
other hemorrhagic fevers.  Exec. Order No. 12,452, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1983), as amended by 
Exec. Order No. 13,375 (2005), available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/ 
codification/executive-order/12452.html.  President Bush amended the list again in April 
2005 to include influenza viruses with pandemic potential on the list of quarantinable 
diseases.  See Exec. Order No. 13,375 (2005), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/ 
cfr_2006/janqtr/pdf/3CFR13375.pdf. 
 68. Peiris et al., supra note 66, at 617; Y.L. Lau, Editorial, Avian Influenza, 9 HONG 
KONG J. PAEDIATRICS 101, 101 (2004), available at http://hkjpaed.org/details.asp?id=61& 
show=1234.  The successful effort to contain H5N1 in Hong Kong in 1997 was led by Dr. 
Margaret Chan, Hong Kong’s health officer.  Following the death in 2006 of Dr. J. W. Lee, 
WHO Director General, Dr. Chan was elected Director General and remains in that post 
today.  Prior to her election, she was Assistant Director General for Communicable Diseases 
and the Director General’s Special Representative for Pandemic Influenza.  EMMA CHANLETT- 
AVERY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33871, FOREIGN COUNTRIES’ RESPONSE TO THE AVIAN 
INFLUENZA (H5N1) VIRUS: CURRENT STATUS 6 (2007); Dr. Margaret Chan, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/dg/en/ (last visited November 19, 2010); Former Director-General Dr. 
LEE Jong-wook, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/dg/lee/en/ (last visited Nov. 19, 
2010). 
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Tamiflu for the Strategic National Stockpile.69  But this later action was not 
without controversy.  Several officials outside of HHS questioned the need 
for acquiring influenza antiviral drugs and even wondered about whether the 
Strategic National Stockpile70 had legal authority to make such purchases.  
These objections made it perfectly clear that there was no consensus within 
the Bush Administration about the severity of the pandemic threat.  To 
address this problem, I hosted a series of presentations on influenza in the 
Secretary’s Conference Room at HHS, including discussions on the 1918, 
1957, and 1968 pandemics, the 1976 swine flu affair,71 and the 1997 
emergence of H5N1 in Hong Kong.72  In addition to HHS officials, these 
sessions were attended by individuals from OMB, the Office of the Vice 
President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy.  The purpose was to educate colleagues about the virus 
and the potential threat.  But while the sessions were generally successful 
and a broader understanding of the pandemic threat resulted, there 
remained little consensus on how much should be invested in preparing for 
a pandemic. 
VII.  2004 CHIRON VACCINE CRISIS 
By 2004, there were only two makers of U.S. licensed inactivated flu 
vaccine: Sanofi Pasteur and Chiron.73  Medimmune was licensed to make 
the live attenuated Flumist vaccine74—but their capacity was fairly modest.  
Approximately one-half of the inactivated vaccine was made in the U.S. by 
Sanofi Pasteur75 and one-half made in Liverpool, UK by Chiron.76  Late in 
the Summer of 2004—an election year—we learned that the Liverpool plant 
had been inspected by the United Kingdom’s Medicine and Healthcare 
Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), the British equivalent to the FDA, and 
the MHRA had concluded that the Chiron plant had major deficiencies in 
 
 69. Tamiflu® (Oseltamivir) and Relenza® (Zanamivir) were the only licensed antiviral drugs 
effective against H5N1.  See Anne Moscona, Neuraminidase Inhibitors for Influenza, 353 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1363, 1373 (2005). 
 70. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN 8 (2005), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/HHSPandemicInfluenzaPlan.pdf. 
 71. See RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARVEY V. FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR: DECISION-
MAKING ON A SLIPPERY DISEASE passim (1978). 
 72. These sessions included presentations by Dr. D.A. Henderson, Dr. Jeffrey 
Taubenberger of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Dr. Michael Osterholm of the 
University of Minnesota, Dr. James LeDuc, and Dr. Nancy Cox, Chief of the CDC Influenza 
Branch. 
 73. Flu Shot Shortage Looms, supra note 67. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
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regulatory compliance.77  The result was that the MHRA would not release 
the Chiron vaccine.78  Suddenly the U.S. had lost half of its flu vaccine and 
just in time for the first presidential debate.  So, for a time, the influenza 
vaccine became a rather hot political topic—even then-Governor Rod 
Blagojevich got into the act by purchasing a number of lots of un-licensable 
influenza vaccine from Europe.79  Luckily, the flu was not particularly severe 
in 200480 and Sanofi Pasteur, the remaining supplier of licensed inactivated 
flu vaccine, did excellent work to make up for the loss of the Chiron vaccine.  
In fact, at the end of the 2004/2005 flu season, thousands of doses had 
gone unused.81 
The reemergence of H5N1 and the loss of the Chiron vaccine together 
signaled the beginning of the end of influenza’s time in the political 
wilderness.  Suddenly, it became a political liability to ignore influenza 
preparedness.  Accordingly, the President’s 2005 budget submission again 
requested $100 million for the HHS pandemic vaccine initiative and this 
time Congress funded the total amount.82  We also substantially increased 
 
 77. Flu Vaccine License is Suspended, BBC NEWS, Oct. 5, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/health/3717726.stm. 
 78. Id. 
 79. FDA Yet to Deal with Many Details of States Importing Flu Vaccine, FDA WEEK, Nov. 
12, 2004, at 1, 9; David Bernstein, Mr. Un-Popularity, CHICAGO MAG. (2008), http://www.chi 
cagomag.com/core/pagetools.php?pageid=7444&url=%2FChicago-Magazine%2FFebruary 
-2008%2FMr-Un-Popularity%2F&mode=print. 
 80. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
AVIAN INFLUENZA: CURRENT H5N1 SITUATION (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/ 
avian/outbreaks/pdf/current.pdf; 2004-2005 U.S. Influenza Season Summary, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 7, 2005), http://www.cdc.gov/flu/weekly/weeklyarchives 
2004-2005/04-05summary.htm; Influenza Pandemics, HIST. OF VACCINES, http://www.history 
ofvaccines.org/content/articles/influenza-pandemics (last visited Nov. 19, 2010). 
 81. SARAH A. LISTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32655, INFLUENZA VACCINE SHORTAGES 
AND IMPLICATIONS 6 tbl.1 (2004); Lon McQuillan et al., Impact of the 2004_2005 Influenza 
Vaccine Shortage on Pediatric Practice: A National Survey 123 PEDIATRICS e186, e188 (2009); 
Strengthening the Nation’s Influenza Vaccination System: An NVAC Assessment, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/nvac/influenzareportfinal1204.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2010).  Had more vaccine been needed, it could have been lawfully 
imported from foreign sources.  Following the loss of the Chiron vaccine, HHS created a 
special program that granted Investigational New Drug (IND) status to certain foreign-made 
influenza vaccines so that these products could have been imported to the U.S. under an IND 
protocol through a system developed by the Office of the Secretary, CDC, FDA, NIH, HRSA, 
and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).  See Influenza Vaccine Supply, 
Statement Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Res., 109th Cong. passim (2005) (statement 
of Jesse L. Goodman, Director, Center for Biologics, Evaluation, and Research), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm161669.htm. 
 82. FY2004 BUDGET IN BRIEF, supra note 64, at 102.  See also HHS awards $97 Million 
Contract to Develop Cell Culture-Based Influenza Vaccine, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., Apr. 1, 2005, http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/20050401.html. 
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our stockpiling of influenza antiviral drugs known to be effective against 
H5N1.83 
VIII.  THE GREAT INFLUENZA 
But the push to prepare in historic, sustainable terms began with the 
publication of John Barry’s magnificent book, The Great Influenza.84  As I 
noted, the 2005 budget made a meaningful investment in cell-culture 
vaccine.  Thanks to this funding, a contract was awarded to Sanofi Pasteur 
to begin serious R&D work on a cell culture influenza vaccine.85  But in the 
world of vaccine development, $100 million does not go very far.86  If we 
were going to drastically change our vaccine production infrastructure to 
keep pace with the emergence and reemergence of pandemic strains, the 
U.S. would need to invest billions. 
At the end of 2004, Secretary Thompson left HHS for the private sector 
and was replaced by Michael O. Leavitt, the former Governor of Utah and, 
more recently, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).87  
It was not a foregone conclusion that Governor Leavitt would retain me as 
an Assistant Secretary.  Like all HHS division and office heads, I went to EPA 
to brief Governor Leavitt about my office and our mission.  This meeting was 
framed as a substantive discussion, but it was also an audition.88  I gave him 
 
 83. HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, supra note 70, at F-38. 
 84. BARRY, supra note 15.  Since the release of The Great Influenza, Barry has continued 
his research on the 1918 outbreak and made important contributions to pandemic 
preparedness.  See generally John M. Barry, Cecile Viboud & Lone Simonsen, Cross-
protection Between Successive Waves of the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic: Epidemiological 
Evidence from US Army Camps and from Britain, 198 J INFECTIOUS DISESEASES 1427 (2008); 
JOHN M. BARRY, WHITE PAPER ON NOVEL H1N1: PREPARED FOR THE MIT CENTER FOR ENGINEERING 
SYSTEMS FUNDAMENTALS passim (2009), available at http://esd.mit.edu/wps/2009/esd-wp-
2009-07-072709.pdf; John Barry, 5 Things You Didn’t Know About the Flu, Sept./Oct. 2010, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/16/the_flu. 
 85. HHS Awards Contracts Totaling More than $1 Billion to Develop Cell-Based Influenza 
Vaccine, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., May 4, 2006, http://archive.hhs.gov/news/ 
press/2006pres/20060504.html. 
 86. SANOFI AVENTIS, SANOFI PASTEUR AWARDED $97 MILLION HHS CONTRACT TO 
ACCELERATE CELL-CULTURE PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINE DEVELOPMENT (2005), available at 
http://en.sanofi-aventis.com/binaries/050405_PDF_Cell_Culture_media_tcm28-14866.pdf. 
 87. Biography of Mike Leavitt, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/dhhssec.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2010); Tommy Thompson, Secretary of Health & Human Services (2001-
2005), WHITE HOUSE, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/government/thompson-
bio.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2010). 
 88. This meeting included Rich McKeown, Governor Leavitt’s Chief of Staff at EPA; 
Natalie Gochnour, EPA Associate Administrator for Public Affairs; and Kerry Weems, Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Budget, Technology and Finance, HHS.  McKeown and Gochnour (who 
accompanied Governor Leavitt to HHS) and Weems were instrumental in developing and 
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an in-depth briefing on the department’s preparedness mission—for both 
bioterrorism and naturally occurring threats.  At the conclusion of the 
meeting, I gave Governor Leavitt a copy of The Great Influenza and 
suggested he read it.  I told him it was a good primer on the pandemic 
threat.  Once he had been confirmed and in office a few weeks, I asked 
Secretary Leavitt if he had had a chance to read the book.  He said he was 
about half way through and that what he had read thus far was sobering—
to say the very least.  About a month after this, the Secretary called me to his 
office and asked how long it would take me to prepare a highlighted and 
tabbed version of The Great Influenza.  I told him I could have it done by 
the end of the day.  A week or so later, I was in the Secretary’s outer office 
and there was an assembly line of people tabbing and highlighting the book 
according to my template.  The Secretary told me that he intended to give a 
tabbed and highlighted copy of the book to members of the various 
Congressional committees with jurisdiction over HHS.  I have to admit I was 
skeptical that this would amount to much, but nothing else had worked so it 
seemed worth a try.  Over the course of several months, Secretary Leavitt 
met (individually or in groups) with dozens of Senators and Members of 
Congress.  He distributed tabbed and highlighted copies of The Great 
Influenza, described the pandemic threat, and told them HHS needed an 
immediate, substantial infusion of resources to deal with it.  Following one 
of Secretary Leavitt’s closed-door sessions about the pandemic threat, 
Senator Harry Reid remarked that the briefing “scared the hell out of me.”89  
Shortly thereafter, Congress included approximately $3.3 billion for 
pandemic preparedness in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to 
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 
2006.90  In May 2006, HHS announced that it had entered into contracts 
totaling more than $1 billion with five pharmaceutical firms to develop cell-
culture influenza vaccine.91  Less than two years before, $100 million for 
cell-culture vaccine was out of the question.  But in the fall of 2005, 
pandemic influenza was finally getting the attention it deserved. 
IX.  INFLUENZA: THE MAIN ATTRACTION 
Once pandemic influenza captured the attention of political leaders and 
policymakers, a number of changes occurred in the way the influenza policy 
 
executing Leavitt’s pandemic preparedness strategy.  All three made meaningful and enduring 
contributions to pandemic preparedness. 
 89. Harris, Fear of Flu Outbreak Rattles Washington, supra note 26. 
 90. Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address 
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 
119 Stat. 2783, 2786. 
 91. See HHS Awards Contracts, supra note 85. 
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was developed and executed.  Thanks in large part to Secretary Leavitt’s 
advocacy, The White House focused like a laser on pandemic 
preparedness.92  The White House Homeland Security Council (HSC) led a 
major effort to develop a national pandemic plan, which covered all 
departments and sectors of critical infrastructure.93  The HSC also 
established an uncommonly productive interagency process, which ensured 
a coordinated and rational approach to addressing pandemic preparedness 
on a national scale, including liability related to pandemic vaccines and 
other countermeasures.94  Few would dispute that domestic public health 
resilience benefited mightily from the Bush Administration’s commitment to 
pandemic preparedness and biodefense.95  The truth of this assertion can be 
seen in the response to H1N1.96 
 
 92. Secretary Leavitt’s leadership on pandemic preparedness was exemplary.  Had he not 
made pandemic preparedness a personal priority, I doubt whether the U.S. would have been 
in much of a position to respond to H1N1. 
 93. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-781, INFLUENZA PANDEMIC: 
FURTHER EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE CLEARER FEDERAL LEADERSHIP ROLES AND AN EFFECTIVE 
NATIONAL STRATEGY 2 (2007).  The HSC influenza effort was ably led first by Dr. Ken Bernard, 
then by Dr. Rajeev Venkayya, and finally by Dr. Robert Kadlec.  All three made important 
contributions to pandemic preparedness. 
 94. Liability is a perennial issue in emergency preparedness, especially when a vaccine or 
other countermeasure is involved.  The Administration worked with Congress to address this 
obstacle to pandemic preparedness in the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 
which was signed into law by President Bush on December 30, 2005.  See 42 U.S.C. § 247d-
6d (2006).  See also Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) for 
Pandemic Influenza Medical Countermeasures Utilization Protocol & Decision Tools, FLU.GOV, 
http://www.flu.gov/professional/federal/prep_act.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). 
 95. For example, Secretary Leavitt convened officials from all fifty states and relevant 
federal departments (i.e., HHS, USDA, and the Department of Homeland Security) on 
December 5, 2005, to begin the process of developing integrated pandemic preparedness 
plans for each state.  Pandemic planning summits were then held in all fifty states.  See 
Pandemic Planning: A Convening of the States, FLU.GOV, http://www.flu.gov/professional/ 
states/convening.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).  An important element of the Bush 
Administration’s biodefense agenda was the Project BioShield Act of 2004, which, among 
other things, created the Emergency Use Authorization (EUA).  EUAs were used to make 
available influenza countermeasures.  Emergency Use Authorization Granted for BioCryst’s 
Peramivir, BIOCRYST PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (Oct. 23, 2009), http://investor.shareholder.com/ 
biocryst/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=417887.  See also Stuart L. Nightingale, Joanna M. 
Prasher & Stewart Simonson, Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) to Enable Use of Needed 
Products in Civilian and Military Emergencies, United States, 13 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
1046, 1046-51 (2007); HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, supra note 70, at S6-1, S6-3, S6-12. 
 96. Indeed, President Obama complimented the Bush Administration’s effort to prepare 
for an influenza pandemic.  See President Barack Obama, News Conference by the President 
(Apr. 29, 2009) (transcript available at Speeches and Remarks, WHITE HOUSE, Apr. 30, 2009, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/News-Conference-by-the-President-4/29/ 
2009/). 
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The Administration’s focus on pandemic preparedness included 
international public health engagement on a historic scale.  Until 2005, 
influenza planning at the federal level was almost entirely the responsibility 
of two agencies: HHS and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).  
Since influenza is a disease of animals that can affect humans, USDA and 
HHS share responsibility for influenza-related policymaking.  Other agencies 
like the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), and Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) were engaged in influenza 
decision-making to the extent such decisions affected them, but national 
contingency planning and international engagement were largely left to 
HHS and USDA.  In 2005, this changed.  The continuing spread of H5N1 
combined with the publication of The Great Influenza galvanized national 
interest in the pandemic threat and the need for serious planning.  The 
HSC-led interagency process focused on the development of President 
Bush’s National Pandemic Plan.97  The Bush Administration also recognized 
that like all of nature, influenza operates outside of the control of human 
institutions and political jurisdictions.  So, international engagement was 
essential if any meaningful progress was to be made in planning for the next 
pandemic.  Accordingly, the State Department was tapped to lead an effort 
to build international support for pandemic planning. 
Three multilateral international organizations have subject matter 
jurisdiction over influenza: WHO, the UN’s Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).98  
Prior to 2005, HHS dealt with WHO on influenza-related matters with little 
or no oversight from the State Department or any other agency of the U.S. 
government.  The same can largely be said for USDA and its influenza 
related work with FAO and OIE.  Furthermore, in ministerial meetings, 
influenza rarely surfaced on the agenda or during informal discussions.  But, 
this changed in September 2005 when President Bush announced in a 
speech to the UN General Assembly the formation of the International 
Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza (IPAPI).99  The objective of 
IPAPI was to develop a consensus on ten core principals that would govern 
pandemic preparedness.100  More than eighty countries and eight 
international organizations participated in the IPAPI process.101  And while 
 
 97. See HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA (2005), 
available at http://www.flu.gov/professional/federal/pandemic-influenza.pdf. 
 98. See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., WORLD ORG. FOR ANIMAL HEALTH & WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., THE FAO-OIE-WHO COLLABORATION 2 (2010), available at http://www.fao.org/ 
docrep/012/ak736e/ak736e00.pdf. 
 99. U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., 2d plen. mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. A/60/PV.2 (Sept. 14, 2005). 
 100. HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs. 
gov/pandemicflu/plan/appendixh.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2010). 
 101. Id. 
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there was nothing particularly novel about the core principals or the 
process, IPAPI raised the profile of influenza preparedness and ensured that 
it would remain an element of international dialogue for the remainder of 
the Bush administration and beyond.  The State Department’s involvement in 
pandemic international engagement went well beyond IPAPI.  In November 
2005, the State Department and HHS co-led the U.S. delegation to a 
special WHO meeting on pandemic preparedness.102  In 2006, the 
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, named Ambassador Nancy Powell as 
the State Department’s first Special Representative for Avian and Pandemic 
Influenza103 and she was succeeded by Ambassador John Lange in 2007 as 
Special Representative.104  Under President Obama and Secretary Clinton, 
the State Department has remained at the center of pandemic international 
engagement.  In March of 2009, the Administration designated 
Ambassador Robert Loftis as the Special Representative for Avian and 
Pandemic Influenza.105 
Beginning in 2005 and continuing through the end of the Bush 
administration, HHS sought to improve global influenza surveillance by 
building capacity at WHO as well as partnering with the Institut Pasteur, 
which operates a network of thirty-two laboratories in Europe, Asia, Africa, 
Latin America, and other international public health institutions.106  At 
WHO, HHS established a fund to defray the cost of shipping influenza 
specimens from poorer countries to one of WHO’s influenza collaborating 
laboratories.107  My HHS colleagues and I had been told by WHO that the 
cost of shipping such samples was a major impediment to closing the gaps 
 
 102. See Meeting on Avian Flu and Human Pandemic Influenza, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2005/avian_influenza/meeting_avian_influenza/en/in
dex.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2010); Meeting on Avian Flu and Human Pandemic Influenza: 
Provisional List of Participants, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/ 
2005/avian_influenza/LOP_AvianInfluenza2.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2010). 
 103. 2006 Homeland Security Medal Recipient, SERV. TO AM. MEDALS, http://serviceto 
americamedals.org/SAM/recipients/profiles/hsm06_powell.shtml (last visited Nov. 19, 2009). 
 104. Vivian Keller, Coming to America?, STATE MAG., June 2006, at 22, 24. 
 105. Biography: Robert Geers Loftis, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/ 
biog/124222.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2010). 
 106. Missions, INSTITUT PASTEUR, http://www.pasteur-international.org/ip/easysite/pasteur-
international-en/institut-pasteur-international-network/missions (last visited Nov. 19, 2010). 
 107. WORLD HEALTH ORG., TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR WHO H5 REFERENCE LABORATORIES 
(2006), available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/torh5reflab2006.pdf.  See also 
Michael O. Leavitt, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Remarks at WHO Plenary 
Session (May 22, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/speech/2006/ 
060522.html).  The UK Secretary of State for Health, Rt. Hon. John Reid, announced a major 
contribution to this fund at the 2004 GHSI ministerial meeting in Paris.  Dr. David Harper, 
Chief Scientist, UK Department of Health, was instrumental in directing this contribution to the 
influenza specimen transport fund. 
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in the global influenza surveillance program.  HHS also assigned HHS 
scientists to work at the WHO influenza program in Geneva and provided 
funding to WHO for an array of influenza preparedness activities, including 
logistics planning and policy development.108 
Establishing a partnership between HHS and Institut Pasteur turned out 
to be a more sensitive undertaking than I had anticipated when I first 
proposed it.  The relationship between HHS and Institut Pasteur had been 
strained for years as a result of a dispute related to the discovery of HIV.109  
The initial overture to Pasteur was somewhat controversial within HHS.  But, 
if we were to make any real progress on closing the gaps in influenza 
surveillance, the Institut Pasteur network had to be part of the solution.  In 
places at greatest risk from H5N1, like Cambodia, Institut Pasteur operated 
the only laboratory capable of isolating the virus.110  So, my HHS colleagues 
and I worked long and hard to build a partnership with Institut Pasteur.111  
 
 108. Dr. Stuart Nightingale, Deputy Assistant Secretary and Chief Medical Officer, HHS 
Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, led an effort to gain adoption of a resolution 
from the 58th World Health Assembly supporting expedited pandemic influenza planning.  
This resolution was adopted by the Assembly on May 23, 2005, and formed the legal 
foundation for much of what WHO did to prepare for a pandemic.  G.A. Res. 58/5. ¶ 2, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/58/5 (May 23, 2005).  It would be difficult to overstate Dr. Nightingale’s 
contribution to pandemic preparedness, but his service at HHS reached well beyond influenza 
and touched every corner of public health.  Collaborating with Dr. Nightingale was one of the 
high points of my tenure at HHS. 
 109. See Institut Pasteur v. United States, 814 F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Pasteur claimed 
that the National Cancer Institute (NCI), an HHS agency, had breached express and implied 
contracts to share research and recognition related to AIDS virus samples provided by Pasteur 
to NCI.  Id. at 626.  Pasteur alleged that NCI scientists used these samples to acquire 
information which enabled the U.S. to file patent applications for an HIV diagnostic kit.  Id.).  
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Claims and remanded the 
case for further proceedings.  But an out of court settlement was reached following 
negotiations between high-ranking U.S. and French officials.  An agreement signed by 
President Reagan and Prime Minister Jacques Chirac provided that credit for the discovery 
would be shared between the NCI and Pasteur scientists and that income derived from the 
diagnostic kit patents would be divided between the U.S. and Institut Pasteur (both would, in 
turn, contribute a percentage of their share of the royalties to a newly created international 
AIDS research institute).  See Howard L. Singer, Institut Pasteur v. United States: The AIDS 
Patent Dispute, the Contract Disputes Act and the International Exchange of Scientific Data, 25 
AM. J.L. & MED. 439 (1989).  See also Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. and France End Rift on AIDS, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1987, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE0DF1231F 
932A35757C0A961948260. 
 110. INSTITUT PASTEUR, INSTITUT PASTEUR INTERNAT’L NETWORK & WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
PARTNERSHIPS 4 (2009), available at http://www.pasteurfoundation.org/pdf/IP-WHO%20 
Collaborations.pdf. 
 111. The following HHS officials were instrumental in developing the partnership with 
Institut Pasteur: Dr. H. Clifford Lane, Dr. Carole Heilman, Dr. Stuart Nightingale,  Dr. Amar 
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Thanks to supportive leadership at Pasteur112 and a genuine desire on both 
sides to close the book on the HIV dispute, HHS and Institut Pasteur 
executed a memorandum of understanding creating a partnership on 
influenza surveillance.113  During this period, HHS also funded influenza 
surveillance projects in Vietnam,114 reestablished a relationship with the 
Gorgas Memorial Institute (GMI) in Panama,115 and substantially increased 
funding for influenza surveillance at the International Centre for Diarrheal 
Disease Research in Dhaka, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B).116  These partnerships 
remain active today and form the basis for joint influenza surveillance 
projects worldwide. 
X.  THE FUTURE 
During the eight years of the Bush Administration, an enormous amount 
of effort and political capital went into pandemic preparedness.  Without 
this work, the U.S. would not have been in any position during the 
2009/2010 season to produce both an annual trivalent vaccine and a 
special monovalent vaccine (H1N1).117  While the H1N1 pandemic turned 
out to be substantially less severe than either the 1957 or 1968 pandemics, 
 
Bhat, Capt. Philip Budashewitz, USPHS, Dr. Bruce Gellin, Dr. Linda Lambert, Dr. James 
LeDuc, Dr. William Steiger, and Lily Engstrom. 
 112. The partnership with Institut Pasteur would not have been possible without the 
unwavering commitment of Prof. Alice Dautry, President, Institut Pasteur, Amb. Michele 
Boccoz, then-Executive Vice President, Institut Pasteur, Dr. Paul Brey, Institut Pasteur’s 
Southeast Asia Regional Advisor and Caitlin Hawke, Executive Director, Pasteur Foundation. 
 113. HHS and Institut Pasteur Partner on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (February 6, 2006), http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/20 
060206.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).  See also HHS Partnership on Pandemic 
Preparedness, PASTEUR FOUND., http://www.pasteurfoundation.org/dhhs.shtml (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2010). 
 114. Agreement on Health and Medical Sciences Cooperation Between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (July 28, 2009), http://www.globalhealth.gov/news/ 
agreements/ia072006.html. 
 115. HHS Secretary and Panamanian Health Minister and Gorgas Memorial Institute Agree 
to Expand Cooperative Public Health Efforts, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (April 14, 
2006), http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/20060414.html. 
 116. HHS Assistant Secretary Simonson Travels to Bangladesh and India to Enhance 
Planning for a Potential Influenza Pandemic, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (April 27, 
2006), http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/20060427.html. 
 117. Final Estimates for 2009-10 Seasonal Influenza and Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 
Monovalent Vaccination Coverage – United States, August 2009 Through May, 2010, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/vaccination/ 
coverage_0910estimates.htm (last updated Oct. 7, 2010); 2001 H1N1 Vaccine Doses 
Allocated, Ordered, and Shipped by Project Area, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/vaccinesupply.htm (last updated Mar. 4, 2010). 
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imagine what would have happened if H1N1 had been even half as deadly 
as the 1918 pandemic.  Thanks to investments in infrastructure and effective 
project management at HHS, a special H1N1 vaccine was ready in time to 
have an impact.  But, this may not be the case next time.  The fact is that a 
campaign vaccine made with 1950s technology and totally dependent on 
chickens is no way to prepare for a threat like the 1918 pandemic.  Even 
with a contingency flock and extreme biosecurity, the current vaccine is 
vulnerable to catastrophic failure—that is, loss of the flocks that lay the eggs 
that make the vaccine.  And yield remains a major variable that can be 
better controlled with cell-culture production.  But the only way to take 
influenza off the table as a threat is to develop and license a universal 
vaccine—one that protects against all influenza viruses and that can be 
administered in advance of a pandemic strain emerging.  Such a vaccine is 
years away and will require substantial, consistent funding from Congress. 
The U.S. and other developed countries also need to do much more to 
provide pandemic preparedness assistance to the developing world.  Today, 
influenza is essentially a disease of wealthy countries.  Not that it only 
sickens people from such countries—obviously this is not the case.  But for 
those who live in the developing world, there is absolutely no reasonable 
expectation of ever seeing influenza vaccine or antiviral drugs, no matter 
how severe the outbreak.  So, influenza is a disease of the well-to-do 
because only the well-to-do can do anything about it.  This might be a 
purely humanitarian concern if it were not for two considerations.  First, 
developing countries are an essential partner in influenza surveillance.  
Remember H5N1 is widespread in Asia.118  And many countries most at risk 
for the emergence or re-emergence of novel influenza viruses—viruses with 
pandemic potential—have absolutely no incentive to spend precious 
resources on looking for an infectious disease that they can do nothing 
about.  This must change if we expect their full participation in infectious 
disease surveillance.  They must have access to the fruits of their labor—and 
in time to make a difference.  Providing developing countries access to 
vaccine—and in quantities sufficient to protect them—is one way to 
incentivize their full participation in the global influenza surveillance 
enterprise. 
The second reason developing countries are important to U.S. 
pandemic preparedness is that the world is many orders of magnitude more 
connected today than it was in 1918.  We have a vested interest in 
preventing the developing world from being ravaged by a pandemic.  When 
I say we have a vested interest, I mean this to include a national security 
interest.  Today, manufacturing in the U.S. relies heavily on the developing 
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world for raw materials and constituent components.  And so much of what 
we consume comes from abroad.  Last year when H1N1 was still spreading, 
a British newspaper reported that a U.N. analysis concluded that H1N1 
could cause large-scale anarchy in the developing world unless vaccine and 
antiviral drugs were made available to these countries.119  And H1N1 was 
known at that time to be a relatively mild virus.  Imagine what such a U.N. 
analysis would say about a 1918-like event. 
Logic seems to compel, then, that the U.S. and other developed 
countries consistently and meaningfully invest in influenza preparedness.  
We need to improve and secure egg-based infrastructure, license a cell-
culture vaccine, discover better diagnostics, and develop a recombinant 
vaccine.  And while it may take years to achieve, our (properly funded) goal 
must always be a universal influenza vaccine—the Holy Grail of influenza 
preparedness.  As we make advances, we also must ensure that developing 
countries have meaningful access to these advances and share in our 
improved ability to protect ourselves.  But, all of this takes money and a 
great deal of it.  Now that the H1N1 pandemic is over, there will be 
enormous pressure to declare victory and move on.  Indeed, there has 
already been at least one attempt to shift funding away from the HHS 
pandemic preparedness program.120  While we have come a long way in 
the last few years, it is simply not intellectually honest to say that we are 
ready for a 1918-like event.121 
The 1918 pandemic was a catastrophe and there is absolutely no 
reason to think it will not happen again—quite the contrary.  And while the 
H1N1 was a mild pandemic, it should remind us how vulnerable we are to 
the caprices of Mother Nature.  The only way to protect ourselves against a 
1918-like catastrophe is to invest in the full-range of influenza 
countermeasures, including recombinant vaccines.  In hard times this is a 
difficult sell.  But, if we choose to ignore the danger and take solace in the 
experience of the H1N1, we will live to regret it.122 
  
 
 119. Rajeev Syal, Poor Nations Need £900m to Avert Swine Flu Disaster, OBSERVER, Sept. 
20, 2009, at A23. 
 120. See Matishak, supra note 6. 
 121. See Martin Enserink & Jon Cohen, The Novel H1N1 Influenza, 326 SCIENCE 1607, 
1607 (2009). 
 122. It is difficult to overstate the devastation that can be wrought by pandemic influenza.  
Indeed, the 1918 pandemic has been compared with the Black Death.  See ALFRED W. 
CROSBY, supra note 15, at 257 (In discussing factors that influenced morbidity and mortality 
during the 1918 pandemic, Professor Crosby observed that “[i]f either complacency, 
incompetency, sickness, or bad luck crippled the ability of the leaders to react efficiently to the 
pandemic, then Spanish influenza could be as deadly as the Black Death.”  Id.). 
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